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Ownership Structure and Audit Quality: An Empirical Analysis Considering
Ownership Types in Jordan
Abstract
This study provides up-to-date evidence concerning the different corporate ownership types
and their effect on audit quality in Jordan, and by extension to other developing countries
with similar institutional environments. Different types of shareholders have different
investment policies and targets, which affects how they exercise their monitoring role over
the investee firms. However, the literature suffers from a tight focus on overall ownership
concentration, with less attention to identities of the shareholders. This focus motivates the
study to go further and test whether the demand for audit quality varies across different
ownership identities. This study sheds light on this relationship in one of the developing 
countries where investor protection is relatively weak and overall regulations remain
underdeveloped. To obtain robust results, the study employs different estimation methods and
scales audit fees according to firm size in order to reduce spurious correlations and
heterogeneity of variance due to firm size. The results show the importance of family, banks,
and government ownership in ensuring high audit quality. Conversely, ownership by non-
financial institutions and foreigners does not affect audit quality. Beyond its contribution to
the literature, this study offers useful feedback for regulatory bodies to consider ownership
types during their deliberations, assists investors in making better-informed decisions, and
benefits other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by 
ownership structure in audit quality. This feedback can also apply to other countries with
ownership structures and regulatory frameworks similar to those in Jordan.
Keywords: audit quality, ownership structure, family ownership, foreign ownership, government
ownership, institution ownership, Jordan
1. Introduction
1.1. Study Overview
Over the past two decades, Jordan successfully walked down the path towards a free







             
            
           
         
             
            
     
  
           
          
           
       
            
    
  
            
          
       
     
    
           
         
           
         
         
continuing interest in developing the financial market in order to boost investors’ confidence
and attract more investment. The external audit function plays a significant role in the
corporate governance system because it bridges the gap between those who prepare financial
information (management) and those who use it (stakeholders). Therefore, external auditing
is a key monitoring tool because it enhances the quality of financial statements and helps
investors with their investment decisions by giving them confidence about the company’s
financial status (Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright,
2002).
Given that most developing countries are characterised by a weak legal protection for
investors compared to the developed countries, the concentration of ownership can play an 
effective role as a corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholders’ wealth (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, this study examines ownership concentration in Jordan and its
effect on audit quality. It focuses on the common ownership identities in Jordan, namely
family, financial institutions (banks), non-financial institutions, government, Arab foreign,
and non-Arab foreign ownership.
By using a sample of 115 listed Jordanian firms over 8 years (2009-2016) and
employing different estimation methods, the study highlights the importance of family
ownership, bank ownership, and government ownership in ensuring high audit quality.
However, audit quality is not affected of a company’s ownership by non-financial institutions,
Arab foreign owners, and non-Arab foreign owners. 
This study contributes to the literature by going beyond the tight focus of merely 
ownership concentration and examines the role played by the most common ownership
identities. The literature suffers from a scarcity of such research in the developing countries, 
particularly concerning the effect of foreign ownership and government ownership on audit







        
        
            
    
   
           
      
           
           
            
        
           
        
 
         
          
           
           
     
            
             
          
  
consider the common ownership types during their rulemaking processes. It also helps
financial market participants with making better-informed investment decisions and aids
other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership
structure in audit quality. 
1.2. Study Motivation
There is a plethora of research on ownership concentration as a corporate governance
mechanism in Anglo-American and continental European countries. However, countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter MENA) have received minimal attention, and
corporate governance research in this region remains underdeveloped. The research from the
developed markets leaves uncertainties with respect to the direction and magnitude of the
empirical relationship in a developing market, such as Jordan. These uncertainties come from
the institutional differences between development markets and Jordan, such as Jordan’s less
restrictive auditor’s liability, lower disclosure requirements, and lower government
enforcement.
Ownership structure is an important governance mechanism, particularly in the
absence of a strong legal environment. As in many developing economies, Jordan’s legal
system does not offer sufficient protection for investors, which makes it commonplace for
companies being controlled by large shareholders. In this vein, the different types of
controlling shareholders have different investment policies and motivations, which 
consequently affects how they exercise their control rights over the investee firms. Niemi
(2005) noted that a focus on concentration of ownership without considering each type of








            
           
      
     
       
  
           
      
           
        
          
    
        
          
    
      
         
           
 
           
    
         
          
                                                 
                   
             
                      
                   
1 
In addition, this study distinguishes itself from other relevant studies in many other
ways . First, this study considers all of the most common ownership identities in the market. 
Excluding Niemi (2005), previous studies tend to focus on one ownership type, e.g., family
ownership (Niskanen, Karjalainen, & Niskanen, 2010), institutional ownership (Kane &
Velury, 2004; Mitra, Hossain, & Deis, 2007), or ownership concentration itself (Hay,
Knechel, & Ling, 2008; Piot, 2001).
Second, given that company size is a main determinant of audit fees (Abbott, Parker,
Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003; Simunic, 1984) and has overwhelming influence over other
firm characteristics, scaling audit fees according to firm size is essential to mitigate spurious
correlations due to size in order to obtain better inferences. Apart from Mitra et al. (2007), no
previous study considered this point, which makes the previously documented relationships
with audit fees questionable.
Third, to the best of my knowledge this is the first study which examines the effect of
foreign ownership on audit quality in a developing country.2 Foreign investment is essential
to global economic development, with flows exceeding US$1.5 trillion in 2011 (UNCTAD,
2012), and the openness of the Jordanian capital market to foreign investors in recent years is
associated with a greater demand for better corporate governance and transparent financial
numbers. Thus, it is worthwhile to study foreign ownership and its association with audit
quality. 
Fourth, all prior relevant studies used data for one financial year and, consequently,
obtained their findings through cross-sectional regression (except Niskanen et al., 2010). The
cross-sectional methodological approach can give biased estimates of the relationship
between company characteristics and audit fees due to the endogenous determination of
1 Appendix 1 also clarifies the importance of this study and its contribution to the literature. It summarises the
 
main relevant literature in terms of context, methodology, the variables used, and measurements.
 
2 Niemi (2005) is limited to Finnish firms audited only by the Big Six. It relied only on 1996 data and used
 








         
         
            
           
           
         
       
           
          
        
      
       
         
   
       
          
         
          
            
       
      
   
         
           
           
company characteristics and audit fees (Vafeas & Waegelein, 2007). To mitigate this
problem, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) suggest considering parallel changes in the potential
determinants of audit fees by employing additional years of audit fee data. Therefore, this
study provides better inferences by employing a panel data approach that uses observations
over eight years. Finally, it contributes to the methodology literature by considering a panel-
data analysis using different estimation methods, including the fixed-effect method, the
random-effect method and the robust standard error estimation method, to ensure the validity 
of the data analysis and, consequently, more-rigorous findings in this kind of study.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses audit quality in Jordan and
appropriate proxies of audit quality. Section 3 highlights the theoretical framework. A 
literature review and hypotheses development are presented in section 4. Section 5 shows the
research method, a description of variables, and the model specification. The findings are
discussed in section 6. Section 7 includes the study’s conclusion, implications, and avenues
for future research.
2. Audit quality: background and measurements
Audit quality in Jordan received more attention in the late 1980s. The Jordan 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) was established in 1987 to improve the
audit profession in the Jordanian market. At that time, the government launched a
privatization program aimed at creating a proper environment to attract investors and
strengthen the financial market via long-term investment. Therefore, the privatization process
placed pressure on Jordan to adopt international accounting practices and created the need for
high-quality auditing (Al-Omari, 2010).
However, the JACPA did not have the power to impose the International Accounting 
Standards and International Standards of Auditing on companies until 1997, when Jordan’s







          
         
           
      
           
        
     
    
          
        
          
          
     
   
       
          
         
    
        
               
           
    
                                                 
                 
                
                 
                
          
JACPA. The audit environment became more regulated after the enactment of these
regulations. These regulations require all listed companies to have their accounts audited by 
an independent auditor and to disclose the audit fees and ownership details in their annual
reports. Furthermore, Jordan’s lower litigation risk compared with most developed countries
might decrease an auditor’s incentive to perform a high quality audit while increasing the
need for an effective corporate governance mechanism (e.g., ownership concentration and
effective audit committees) to demand high-quality audits.
Audit quality is a process of detecting and reporting material misstatement (DeAngelo, 
1981). DeFond and Zhang (2014) extended the definition of audit quality beyond the simple
detection of accounting standard violations to include showing how faithfully financial
statements reflect firms’ underlying economics. It is difficult to assess aud it quality ex-ante
because the amount of assurance provided by auditors is unobservable. The only observable
outcome of the audit process is a common form of audit reports, and most of these reports are
standard clean opinions (Francis, 2004). 
In the literature, two sides exist when considering audit quality: demand and supply.
The input-based proxies (auditor-client contracting features which are mainly audit fees and
audit firms) are more appropriate when considering the demand side of audit quality (DeFond
and Zhang, 2014). This study is interested in the demand side of audit quality; i.e., do family,
government, institutional, and foreign owners “demand” high audit quality? A brief
discussion of the demand-side proxies below addresses why this study uses audit fees as the
most appropriate proxy to capture audit quality and why a Big 4 dummy proxy is less
appropriate in Jordan. 3 
3 Supply-side proxies (e.g., accruals and going concern opinion) are less appropriate given the rationale of my 
study. In addition, these proxies are not without limitations as discretionary accruals tend to have high
measurement error (Elshafie & Nyadroh, 2014) and there is no consensus on how these proxies should be
measured. These accruals can be measured using an absolute value, assigned value, the Jones model, the







       
           
            
           
               
          
          
        
      
          
             
           
             
          
    
             
           
           
         
            
       
           
         
           
          
The amount of fees paid to external auditors is commonly used in high-profile studies
as an indication of audit quality (Abbott et al., 2003; Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 2017; He,
Pittman, Rui, & Wu, 2017; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). A high level of audit fees
implies higher audit quality, ceteris paribus, either through more audit effort exerted (i.e.,
more audit hours) or through a greater expertise of the auditor (higher billing rates) (Francis,
2004). O’Sullivan noted that audit fees is an appropriate proxy for audit quality because it is
expected that a greater amount of audit investigation requires more audit hours and/or the use
of more-specialized audit staff – resulting in higher fees. 
In the Jordanian context, Al-Khaddash, Al Nawas, and Ramadan (2013) conclude that
Jordanian firms should pay high fees as an incentive for auditors to do better work. They 
further mention that if auditors who receive high fees deliver poor audit quality, they would
lose face and feel shame. This result is backed by Alhababsah (2016), who acknowledges the
relevance of audit fees level as a measurement of audit quality in the Jordanian market.
Alhababsah (2016) reached this conclusion based on responses from 199 members of boards
of directors, audit committees, and auditors. 
Although a Big-4 proxy can be used as an indication of audit quality (Francis & Yu,
2009), it is less appropriate in Jordan for several reasons. First, the Big-4 firms in Jordan 
operate through local affiliates (except for Deloitte). These affiliates might not have the same
quality control standards as the Big-4 offices in larger, more developed countries. Second,
Big-4 firms in Jordan do not have a substantial market share relative to developed countries,
because only 35% of the non-financial listed companies are audited by the Big-4 affiliates (37%
of our sample). Third, Defond and Zhang (2014) note the major drawback of using a Big 4
and non-Big 4 dichotomy dummy variable as a discrete measure is its inability to capture
subtle differences in the demand for audit quality. That dummy variable assumes that all







           
     
   
         
             
           
            
           
       
    
        
            
        
           
         
     
     
        
        
              
    
      
        
      
audit quality between these firms, and similarly that all non-Big 4 firms provide the same
lower level of quality audit.
3. Theoretical framework
The agency problem that arises between owners and managers due to information 
asymmetry between them is one of the main motivations for external audit. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argued that because agents act towards maximizing their own benefits even 
at the expense of principals, external auditors have a duty to mitigate the principal-agent
conflict and reduce the information asymmetry between them. Consequently, in the case of a
large agency problem, it is expected that auditors will spend more effort in auditing activities
(delivering higher audit quality). 
Moreover, ownership concentration creates a new agency perspective, which is the
principal-principal model where the conflict is largely between two groups of principals –
majority (controlling) and minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000).
The main problem that stems from principal-principal conflict is expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ value (Bao & Lewellyn, 2017; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this structure of
ownership, major decision rights remain in the hands of a few individuals. Additionally, there
is usually insufficient separation of duties and weak monitoring activities to restrain an abuse
of power by the controlling owners. Consequently, minority shareholders’ concerns about
management and/or controlling shareholders expropriation increase, thereby increasing the
necessity for high audit quality as a means to mitigate these concerns (Fan & Wong, 2005;
Habib & Jiang, 2015). 
4. Literature review and hypotheses development
Ownership concentration is largely addressed in the literature as a corporate







        
           
     
       
         
        
          
        
   
   
         
       
        
         
           
            
          
         
         
        
 
       
      
           
     
Foo, & Teh, 2017). However, empirical results have mixed findings concerning the
monitoring effect of blockholders or whether their presence leads to higher audit quality. 
Furthermore, the literature suffers from a tight focus on overall ownership concentration, with 
less attention to the identities of the shareholders. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Lim, How,
and Verhoeven (2014) strongly recommended considering different types of owners when 
studying ownership structure because they have different investment strategies, incentives,
and monitoring abilities. Based on this notion, this study considers the different ownership
types in the Jordanian market separately (family, financial institutions, non-financial
institutions, government, Arab foreign, and non-Arab foreign ownership).
4.1. Family Ownership
There are different arguments associated with the role played by family members as
controlling shareholders. Previous studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004;
Lim, How and Verhoeven, 2014; Niskanen et al., 2010) fail to agree on whether family
owners increase or decrease agency costs. From one perspective, family shareholders can 
play an important role in minimizing the agency conflict (alignment role). The alignment
argument is based on the idea that there is no harmful conflict between controlling family
owners and other owners, their interests are aligned, and the expropriation concern is thus
decreased (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). This alignment view decreases the incentive to
demand a high audit quality, given the positive association between the need for a higher
audit quality and the severity of the agency problem (Defond and Zhang, 2014; Niskanen et
al. (2010). 
Conversely, high family ownership increases the likelihood of power abuse and
hurting non-family minority shareholders (entrenchment role). In family ownership firms,
executive positions are often occupied by family members, increasing the opportunity to







        
       
          
           
    
        
           
             
             
            
               
          
           
       
          
         
           
       
        
       
      
 
   
         
          
       
Wang, 2006). In the same vein, family ownership might increase the concern that
management acts for the controlling family and disregards other owners. This situation 
reflects the type II agency problem (principal-principal agency problem); consequently, a 
high-quality audit is more likely required to mitigate this agency problem and protect the
interests of other shareholders.
Family reputation is an important issue to consider in the context of family ownership.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) pointed out that family shareholders have a reputational concern 
that motivates them to ensure firm values. This might be particularly relevant for Jordan,
where a firm’s name is often related to the family’s name. In Jordanian society, people tend
to boast of business success and could feel shame in the event of business failure.
Alhababsah (2016) noted that in Jordan the owners of a failed business have a concern with
gloating (schadenfreude) by other competitors. In the same vein, Alhababsah (2016) added
that most family members who control businesses are well known in the society, and,
therefore, they try to maintain their social status.
This reputational concern creates an implicit commitment among family members to
maintain the family name and avoid abusing their power in order to obtain private benefits at
the expense of other shareholders. At the same time, this commitment might increase
incentives of family members to invest more in monitoring cost (e.g., audit cost) to avoid the
adverse consequences (e.g., reputational damage) of presenting fraudulent financial
statements. Consequently, the study develops the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive relationship between family ownership and audit quality.
4.2. Institutional Ownership
Institutional investors play a crucial role in strengthening corporate governance
systems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). They have strong incentives and power for effective







         
         
        
       
       
    
             
          
             
 
              
          
            
       
        
        
              
               
           
   
      
     
         
        
      
incentives and power exist due to their fiduciary duties (Bushee, 2001), large voting blocs 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and better business experience (Pound, 1988). Thus, institutional
investors are most likely to demand (or encourage management to demand) high-quality 
audits as an effective monitoring (bonding) mechanism. 
Mutual funds, hedge funds, endowment funds, pension funds, and commercial banks
are examples of institutional investors in the developed countries (Bushee, 2001; Koh, 2003). 
Except for banks, in the Jordanian market these types of institutional investors are not
common. Given that banks have different control systems and different capital requirements,
this study examines the effect of this type of ownership separately from other institutional
ownership. 
Banks are a special type of institutional investor because they can be owners and
lenders at the same time (Boonyawat, 2013). Bank shareholding creates a close relationship
between banks and other firms (investee firms) that helps banks to play an effective
monitoring role at lower cost (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008; Coffee, 1991). Diamond
(1984) reported that banks have specialized knowledge and better analytical abilities, which 
support their monitoring activities. Moreover, Tian (2004) indicated that if managerial
agency costs are assessed at a high level, banks will be less likely to provide (or renew) a 
loan to the investee firm. This point is particularly true when banks are the main source of
funding, which is the case in Jordan. Therefore, managers might be interested in higher audit
quality to reduce agency cost and to increase the chance of obtaining (or renewing) a loan. In 
addition, bank shareholders are expected to demand high audit quality to curb management
misbehavior and support their monitoring role. 
Conversely, a close relationship between banks and other companies might affect
management incentives, induce companies to select unfavourable investment decisions, and







               
            
            
             
     
       
           
      
          
           
          
           
            
         
  
     
 
        
        
    
               
        
          
                                                 
                  
                  
                
Furthermore, when a bank acts as owner and lender at the same time, it can face a conflict of
interest and might give priority to its own private benefit (Lin, Zhang, & Zhu, 2009). For
instance, when a bank provides a loan to a company it partially owns at a higher cost, this
lending will benefit the bank owners at the expense of the company’s shareholders (Coffee,
1991). Therefore, in case of banks acting towards maximizing their benefits at the expense of
other shareholders, they might be less inclined to demand high audit quality.
Despite the above discussion, evidence remains unclear concerning the role of banks
in developing countries where the regulatory framework remains relatively weak. However,
the bank sector in Jordan is well developed, well organized, and more committed to the
corporate governance code compared with other sectors (Noor & Matar, 2007) 4. Banks in 
Jordan works under strict regulation and close supervision from the Central Bank. In 
summary, it appears reasonable to expect that Jordanian banks are more interested in higher
quality audits because they have incentives and the power to monitor financial reporting and
penalize managers who report low earnings quality. Thus, the study states the following 
hypothesis:
H2: There is a positive relationship between bank ownership and audit quality.
In addition, ownership of business entities from the manufacturing and services
sectors is also considered in this study. These non-financial firms work under different
regulations than banks. These businesses are motivated by the incentives to hold block shares
in other firms as a means of vertical or horizontal business integration, or as a strategy to
diversify their businesses against market risk (Dinga, 2011). Grossman and Hart (1986)
argued that non-financial firms invest in other firms to maximize their profit, expand their
4 Banks in Jordan are the main source of external funds (Al-Fayoumi & Abuzayed, 2009). A ll Jordanian banks
are privately owned; there is no state ownership of these banks. Banks in Jordan hold equity investment in 







      
           
        
    
    
        
          
          





   
          
             
          
             
     
        
      
         
           
     
        
                                                 
                 
                   
business network, control suppliers, or accomplish business integration. Consequently, these
features result in this study separating non-financial institutions from financial institutions. 
However, Alwshah (2009) raised a concern about non-financial institutions' ability to
exert sufficient monitoring. For instance, sometimes the appointment of the representatives of
institutional investors is based on a personal relationship rather than merit (Alwshah, 2009) 5. 
Such a situation may weaken the representative’s position in front of managers due to lack of
experience. The dominant arguments in the literature indicate that institutional investors play 
a better monitoring role than individuals do because investors have more expertise and lead a
professionally managed block of shares. Therefore, this study posits the following 
hypothesis:
H3: There is a positive relationship between ownership of non-financial institutions and audit
quality.
4.3. Government Ownership
Government ownership is a unique type of ownership because the government
representatives are not the true owners and do not personally have cash flow rights (Niemi,
2005). However, government representatives still have an interest in increasing the
credibility of financial reports in order to raise capital and give positive indications of their
obligations to market-oriented policies (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2015). Thus, it is
expected that state representatives are more willing to demand high-quality audits to protect
firm assets, maintain their reputation, and raise capital.
In contrast, government shareholders might have less incentive for effective
monitoring because their behavior could be a function of political interests (Habib,
Ranasinghe, Muhammadi, & Islam, 2018; Lim et al., 2014). Furthermore, Johnson and
Mitton (2003) stated that government representatives intentionally create an opaque
5 Representatives are persons appointed by institutional investors to act on their behalf to manage the investment







           
          
        
       
              
            
 
      
     
        
      
        
           
       
            
       
            
           
          
      
          
          
      
                                                 
                   
             
               
 
information environment to hide their inefficiency and corruption. In this case, it is expected
that these representatives will resist appointing higher-quality auditors. This argument is
consistent with Ben-Nasr et al. (2015), who empirically documented a significantly negative
relationship between government ownership and earnings quality. This result indicates that
the state has incentives to report lower earnings quality to hide the potential “tunnelling6” of
corporate resources for political purposes or to hide any actions that adversely affect other
shareholders.
In Finland, Niemi (2005) failed to find a significant association between government 
ownership and audit quality. Zeitun and Tian (2007) used data of 59 Jordanian firms over the
period 1989–2002 and reported a negative effect of government shareholding on financial
performance. However, since the mid-1990s government ownership significantly decreased
due to the privatization process. After completion of the privatization process (1996–2006),
state ownership is expected to be better because it became more organized and focused
exclusively on the most important and strategic investments.
Attracting foreign investors is a top priority for the Jordanian government due to the 
country’s limited natural resources (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). Successive governments worked
hard during the last two decades to improve the governance and disclosure system and to
increase confidence in the financial market. There is no evidence of adverse behavior by 
government representatives against other investors in Jordan, suggesting that investors have
no problem investing in government-controlled companies7. So government representatives
will most likely demand high-quality audits in order to maintain firms’ value and provide
positive signals to prospective investors. Thus, the relevant hypothesis here is as follows:
H4: There is a positive relationship between government ownership and audit quality.
6 Tunnelling is the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of controlling shareholders, which
 
hurts the interests of minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000).
 











          
        
    
          
            
           
               
            
           
      
       
       
       
       
          
        
         
    
       
 
          
  
                                                 
  
                
              
        
4.4. Foreign Ownership
Previous studies report that foreign investors require more reliable and transparent
information to avoid expropriation by insiders (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015). The literature
documents that foreigners with substantial ownership exert more pressure on management by 
asking for higher audit quality in order to decrease information asymmetry and to obtain 
reliable financial reporting (Jiang & Kim, 2004). At the same time, to attract more foreign 
capital, managers might be interested in demanding high audit quality to send a positive
signal about their integrity. Niemi (2005) found that audit fees (as a proxy for audit quality)
are higher in foreign owned subsidiaries than in locally owned ones in his study of 200 non-
financial Finnish companies audited by a Big Six accounting firm, suggesting that higher
audit quality is related to foreign investors.
Foreign ownership in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) increased drastically in
recent decades. The privatization process played an important role in shaping and adjusting 
ownership structures because it aimed to attract more Arab and non-Arab foreign investment
by opening up the markets and abolishing state monopolies. Arab and non-Arab investments
are common in Jordan and attract considerable attention from the Jordanian regulatory 
bodies. Local investors also welcome foreign investors because they believe that such 
investors contribute positively to firm value. The Privacy Shield Report 8 indicates that
Jordanian businesses actively seek engagement with foreign partners as a means of increasing
their competitiveness, obtaining international experience, and accessing other international
markets9 .
In addition to the relatively small geographical distance between Jordan and other
Arab countries, Arab investors share similar culture, religion, family traditions, language, and
8 https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Jordan-openness-to-foreign-investment
9 Jordanian society is characterized by tolerance towards other religions and ethnicities; so foreigners need not
be concerned about religious or ethnicity-related violence. In addition, the Jordanian constitution stipulates that







          
        
  
          
           
        
        
           
           
         
  
        
         
         
       
       
         
           
        
          
          
          
            
     
                                                 
              
tribal effect to those in Jordan. This similarity helps Arab investors in using informal socio-
cultural networks, making them less sensitive to contextual considerations than non-Arab
investors (Sekkat, 2014). 
Non-Arab foreign investors are expected to have a larger agency problem for several
reasons. The first reason is the physical distance between these foreigners and the Jordanian 
market. Investors who are geographically closer to investee firms have an information 
advantage over other investors, possibly because access to value-relevant information is
relatively more convenient (Baik, Kang, & Kim, 2010; Kang & Kim, 2010). Kang and Kim
(2010) find that the information asymmetry that arises from geographic proximity is an 
important determinant of investors’ decisions because this proximity enhances their
monitoring capabilities.
Second, the language barrier is an important source of information asymmetry 
because it negatively affects the communication process (Kang and Kim, 2010). However,
this factor could be less severe because Jordanian people generally speak English 10 , 
particularly the business community, including stock market brokers, directors, and Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs) of listed companies. Third, cultural differences also increase
information asymmetry (Krug & Nigh, 1998; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). Roth and O'Donnell
(1996) argued that as the cultural gap increases, it becomes more difficult and expensive for
foreign investors to access information about investee firms.
In addition, foreign shareholders from countries with strong shareholders’ rights (i.e.,
investors from western countries) are more likely to be interested in strong corporate
governance than shareholders from countries with weak shareholder rights (Kang and Kim,
2010). The above discussion motivates the study to examine these types of foreign investors
separately, and to state the following hypotheses: 







             
 
         
  
 
   
  
         
          
        
       
             
           
          
        
    
   
    
            
            
              
        
     
         
      
                                                 
           
H5: There is a positive relationship between the level of Arab foreign investment and audit
quality.




The population of the study is the 177 listed non-financial firms in the ASE at the end
of 2016 (Table 1). Financial companies are excluded because they are normally considered
separately due to differences in their businesses and regulatory environment. As presented in 
Table 1, Panel a, the final sample is 115 public non-financial firms (65% of 177). The sample
size appropriately represents the population (Table 1, Panel b), which helps to support the
generalizability of the findings11. Further detailed classification of the firms shows that all
industry sub-sections are represented (Table 1, Panel c). The study covers the period from
2009 to 2016, inclusive. The data are manually collected from annual reports and the
Securities Depository Center.
[Table 1 near here]
5.2. Variables of the study and model specification
The dependent variable is audit quality, which is measured using audit fees as an 
appropriate proxy as discussed in section 2. The audit fees variable is transformed to natural
log to help in achieving normality of data to prevent the largest firms from influencing the
findings. The six different ownership identities are the explanatory variables: family
ownership, financial institution ownership, non-financial institution ownership, government
ownership, Arab foreign ownership, and non-Arab foreign ownership. This study uses a 5%
ownership concentration threshold because Jordanian companies are mandated to disclose







        
          
        
       
          
  
   
              
        
     
        
        
  
             
            
           
             
        
        
              
       
           
  
ownership of 5% and above. To avoid model misspecification, the study considers different
control variables that might potentially affect the dependent variables. These control variables
are well identified by prior research and include company size converted to natural log, 
business complexity measured by number of subsidiaries, leverage, profitability, risk level,
loss, Big-4 audit firms, non-audit service, and industry type. See Table 2 for variable names
and operationalizations.
[Table 2 near here]
The study uses cross-sectional time series model for its analysis (see Table 2). This
audit fees model is characterized by a high degree of consensus on its measurement, with low
measurement error and capture quality variation for a large number of companies (DeFond &
Zhang, 2014; Gul & Goodwin, 2010). Ghosh and Tang (2015) stated that the audit fees model
typically shows greater explanatory power, which decreases concerns about correlated
omitted variables.
Because the dataset contains 115 entities over eight years, the panel data approach is
more appropriate. Panel data can deal with different types of variables including variables
which change between entities but are the same over time (time- invariant variables, e.g.
industry code) and variables that change between entities as well as over time, (e.g. bank
ownership and firms’ profitability) (Wooldridge, 2010). Different estimation methods are
employed, such as the fixed effects model (that tests the relationship between explanatory and
outcome variables within an entity) and the random effects model (which assumes that the
difference between groups is random and uncorrelated with predictor or explanatory 








      
   
            
      
            
            
        
          
              
       
     
     
  
         
           
        
            
        
            
              
       
    
                                                 
                  
          
6. Data analysis and findings discussion
6.1. Descriptive Results
Table 3 (Panels A and B) presents some important variable descriptive statistics.
Family ownership, financial institutions (banks), and non-financial institutions are 12%, 9%, 
and 17%, respectively. These figures are consistent with the notion that this type of
ownership is a common feature of the Jordanian companies and with previous studies about
Jordan (Omran, Bolbol, & Fatheldin, 2008; Zeitun & Gang Tian, 2007). Foreign investments
(which are 12% in total; 8% Arab and 4% non-Arab) changed slightly during 2009–2016
because the ASE obtained increased advantages as the most stable market in the region.
Government ownership is stable over the study period.
[Table 3, Panel A near here]
[Table 3, Panel B near here]
6.2. Correlation Analysis
Because of the non-parametric nature of our data, a Spearman collinearity test is used
to test for variable multi-collinearity (see Table 4). The correlation table shows no multi-
collinearity threat to the interpretation of the regression coefficients. The largest coefficient is
between company size and audit fee (0.66), which is expected because historically size is the
dominant determinant of audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Zaman et al., 2011). To overcome any 
potential problem in the regression, the study addresses this matter in Section 6.4 by scaling
audit fees according to firm size to linearize the relationship between fees and firm size and
12to reduce heterogeneity of variance due to size.
[Table 4 near here]
12 The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance levels (1/VIF) were also checked. They show that all values







     
            
             
            
         
            
         
        
 
    
        
          
           
       
             
    
      
          
        
        
         
         
       
                                                 
                   
                
         
6.3. Results Discussion (Hypotheses Testing)
Table 5 presents regression results of the variables and their effect on audit quality 
measured by a natural log of audit fees. Given that the random effect estimation method is
more appropriate (than the fixed effect one) based on the Hausman test outcome 13 , it is
considered the main estimation method (column 1). Nevertheless, the outcome of the fixed
effect estimation method is very close to the random effect one, and does provide an 
indication about within-firm variations (column 2). Column 3 shows the outcome of Huber-
White’s sandwich estimator, a common, robust regression in the presence of
heteroscedasticity. 
[Table 5 near here]
As expected, the regression shows significant association between family ownership
(FAMILY_OWN) and audit quality (H1). This result supports Anderson and Reeb (2003),
who suggest that family firms have reputational concerns, are interested in protecting their
reputations, and are less inclined to publish misstated financial statement. This scenario is
relevant for Jordan, in which the names of many firms are related to the families’ names, as
indicated in section 4.1.
The regression result with respect to financial institutions ownership
(FIN_INST_OWN) supports the hypothesis (H2). This result is consistent with many
empirical studies that agree on the important role of bank ownership as a provider of effective
monitoring and in decreasing agency problems (Barth, Caprio, Levine 2008; Coffee, 1991).
This result is also consistent with the notion that banks in Jordan are characterized by a sound
corporate governance system and have strong incentives to exert effective monitoring.
Ownership by non-financial institutions (NONFIN_INST_OWN) shows no significant
13 When the Hausman test suggests the random effect model as a superior option, a Lagrange Multip lier test is
used to check whether heterogeneity of entities is significant. The outcome of a Lagrange Mult iplier test







          
         
      
        
       
          
       
         
          
      
    
        
            
   
       
               
          
             
                
             
        
                                                 
               
              
                
           
                    
              
 
relationship with audit quality (H3). This result echoes concerns raised by Alwshah (2009)
that non-financial firms might weaken their monitoring due to significant business
relationships with the investee firms.
Consistent with the hypothesis (H4), audit quality is significantly positively 
associated with government ownership GOV_OWN14. This result is expected because the
behavior of government representatives is ideally consistent with the overall government
strategy concerning attracting investments, so they maintain financial market reputation by 
assuring high audit quality. Conversely, this result is not consistent with Niemi (2005), who
found no such relationship. But Niemi’s study was conducted in Finland, which is
contextually different from Jordan 15 . Both foreign ownership identities, Arab foreign
ownership (ARAB_FOR_OWN) and foreign-non-Arab foreign ownership
(NONARAB_FOR_OWN), are significantly positively correlated with audit quality (H5 and
H6, respectively). However, this result changes in the next section, when the effect of firm
size is considered.
6.4. Further Analysis: Scaling Audit Fees According to Firm Size
Firm size is an agreed determinant of audit fees throughout the literature, and it has a
strong effect on different firm characteristics (overwhelming influence of large firms). So by 
considering the effect of firm size by scaling audit fees according to firm size, the study 
obtains a better indication of the effect of the variables on audit fees. This study scales audit
fees according to firm size to linearize the relationship between fees and size and to reduce
spurious correlations and heterogeneity of variance due to size16 (Simunic, 1980). 
14 The government variable GOV_OWN is omitted under the fixed-effect estimation method (Table 6, co lumn
2). Given that the fixed-effect estimation method considers variations within firms only , any time -invariant
variable will not be presented under this estimation method. The government ownership in Jordanian firms is
stable over the study period and does not change “within” firms.
15 In terms of methodology, Niemi (2005) used only one year in his study and employed a dummy variable for







            
          
          
        
         
             
     
               
          
      
      
           
         
        
        
 
          
           
          
         
            
          
                                                 
             
            
      
                
            
     
The results in column 1 (Table 6) show the outcome of the fixed-effect method17 (the
Hausman test provides an indication about the appropriateness of this estimation method18). 
In addition, given that the outcome of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test still indicates
evidence of heteroscedasticity, the robust standard error method (Huber-White’s sandwich 
estimator) is employed as a more reliable method to diagnose this issue (column 2). 
Table 6 shows the regression results of the effect of ownership type variables and
control variables on the new outcome variable (scaled fees). The results are largely consistent
with the earlier analysis that used the natural log of fees as an outcome variable. The 
variables retain their significant correlation with audit fees even after considering the effect
of firm size, except Arab-foreign ownership (ARAB_FOR_OWN) and non-Arab foreign 
ownership (NONARAB_FOR_OWN). The coefficient estimates indicate the relative changes
in audit fees as follows. Each 1 percent increase in family ownership is associated with 1.7
percent increase in unlogged audit fees, on average, comparing with other firms that do not
have family ownership. Similarly, the increase in audit fees would be 1 percent and 1.4
percent with each 1 percent increase in bank ownership and government ownership,
respectively. 
The two foreign ownership types do not show a significant relationship with audit
quality (H5 and H6). This result weakens the outcome presented in Table 5 and indicates that
foreign investors primarily target large firms for investment. This notion is supported by 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), who found a strong correlation between foreign ownership
and firm size (i.e., foreign investors are more inclined to invest in large firms than in small
ones). Therefore, this insignificant relationship is likely due to foreigners investing in Jordan 
17 As discussed previously, the fixed-effect method omits the time-invariant variables (e.g., GOV_OWN and
INDUSTRY), and financial institution ownership (FIN_INST_ OWN) is insignificant under this method, likely 
due to insignificant variance within firms.
When fixed-effect model is appropriate, it is considered a fully efficient estimation method, and the
estimations of random-effect method become inconsistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). Thus, results of random-








            
    
    
      
            
           
         
         
            
         
           
          
              
          
         
          
          
          
            
         
        
       
     
              
            
as an evolving market for the long term (Tayem, 2015), and the level of monitoring they exert
might be less than expected. 
[Table 6 near here]
7. Conclusion and future research avenues
Given that the literature suffers from a tight focus on ownership concentration and
often ignores the different identities of those shareholders, this study contributes to the
literature by moving beyond this boundary and extending the investigation for all prevalent
ownership types in the context under investigation. Therefore, this empirical paper examines
whether the level of audit quality is related to the different ownership identities.
The important results are that family, government, and bank ownership play a
significant role in ensuring credible audit quality. This result has implications for regulatory 
bodies, such as the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), to encourage the participation of
these types of investors in the capital markets. However, the analysis shows that the level of
non-financial institutional ownership is not related to audit quality. This result also has
implications for policymakers. For instance, the result encourages and motivates these non-
financial institutions to provide effective (productive) monitoring over the firms they invest
in because doing so can enhance the reliability and transparency of reported earnings.
Financial market participants can also benefit from this study to make better- informed
investment decisions. In other words, it might affect the behavior of investors and reduce
their concern that large shareholders might exploit corporate assets.
Like any research project, this study is not without limitations. First, the study 
excluded financial companies because they are normally considered separately due to
differences in their businesses and in their regulatory environment. In this vein, future studies
could focus on financial companies given their vital role in the Jordanian financial market. 







         
           
 
          
             
              
           
             
          




         
     
self-administrated questionnaires or interviews might provide richer insights and a more
accurate picture concerning the role of different ownership types in ensuring higher audit
quality. 
Third, audit quality is difficult to measure because the level of assurance provided by 
auditors is unobservable. The audit fees model is employed to capture audit quality because
audit effort and audit fees are highly correlated, but ideally actual audit hours spent in the
auditing process by analyzing timesheets of auditors and determining the time spent for each 
audit assignment (rather than audit fees) would be a better indicator of audit effort. Finally, 
in order to increase generalizability, future research could do a comparative study of Jordan 
with other developed or developing countries to highlight the effect of different institutional
settings.
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Table 1: Sample description
Panel a: Sample determination Numbers
Listed non-financial companies in ASE as of 31/12/2016 177
Missing data (62)
Final sample 115
Panel b: Sectors in Jordan as classified by ASE Total population Sample included
- Financial sector Excluded Excluded
- Manufacturing sector 64 43
- Services sector 113 72
Total 177 115
Panel c: Sub-sectors of the included sample Total population Sample included
Services sector
- Health care 4 3
- Education 6 4
- Hotel and tourism 11 8
- Transport 11 5
- Communication 1 1
- Media 2 1
- Utilities 3 2
- Commercial services 75 48
Total for service firms 113 72
Industrial sector
- Pharmaceutical 6 6
- Chemical 10 7
- Paper and printing 4 2
- Food and beverage 10 7
- Tobacco 2 2
- Mining 14 10
- Engineering and construction 7 4
- Electric industries 5 3
- Textile and leather 6 2







         
                
               
                 
        
 
 
            
     
 
           
   
  
     
    
 
   
  
    




        
  
 
         
  
 
       
 
 
          
   
 
    
          
        
 
          
            
   
 
            
          
 
          
           
      
     
 
         
     
 
 
Table 2: Regression model and definition of the variables
lnFEESit = β0 + β1 FAMILY_OWNit+ β2 FIN_INST_OWN it +β3 NONFIN_INST_OW N it + β4 GOVit + β5
ARAB_FOR_OWN it + β6 NONARAB_FOR_OWN it + β7 BIG4it + β8LN_ FIRMSIZEit +β9 NUMSUBS it + 
β10 LEVit + β11 ROAit + β12 RISK + β13 LOSS+ + β14 NONAUDIT_FEESit +β15 INDUSTRY +e
Variable symbol Variable name Description and measurement Expected
coefficient
sign
lnFEES Audit fees Total amount paid to auditors as statutory audit
fees (converted to natural log)
FAMILY_OWN Family ownership Percentage of family ownership in the firm +
FIN_INST_OWN Ownership of
financial institutions 
Percentage of financial institution (bank)
ownership in the firm
+
NONFIN_INST_OWN Ownership of non-
financial institutions 
Percentage of corporate (non-financial




Percentage of government ownership in the firm +
ARAB_FOR_OWN Arab-foreign
ownership
Percentage of Arab foreign ownership in the firm +
NONARAB_FOR_OWN Non-Arab-foreign
ownership
Percentage of non-Arab foreign ownership in the
firm 
+
LEV Leverage Debt as a percentage of total assets +
NUMSUBS Number of
subsidiaries 
Number of subsidiaries +
LOSS Loss Dummy variable equals 1 if a company reported
loss in last two years, 0 otherwise.
+
RISK Risk Percentage of current assets to total assets +
ROA Return on asset Net profit as a percentage of total assets 
(indication of profitability)
-
BIG4 BIG4 audit firm Dummy variable equals 1 if the company is
audited by one of Big 4 audit firms, 0 otherwise.
+
LnFIRMSIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets +
NONAUDIT_FEES Non-audit fees Dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm 
provides non-audit service jointly with the
obligatory audit work, 0 otherwise
-
INDUSTRY Industry Dummy variable equals 1 if manufacturing firm 








           






































            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            



























































































































2009 13,660 10.7 8.1 19 1.2 7.4 3.4 6,814 6.8 1.26 45 1.90
2010 13,944 11.0 8.1 18 1.2 7.0 3.5 6,936 7.8 1.30 44 0.07
2011 14,262 12.0 9.0 17 1.2 8.0 3.3 7,794 7.6 1.39 42 0.02
2012 14,620 12.0 9.0 17 1.2 8.0 3.5 8,000 8.0 1.30 43 0.05
2013 15,178 12.0 9.0 15 1.2 8.7 3.6 8,578 8.0 1.36 41 1.50
2014 15,351 12.0 9.0 16 1.2 8.4 3.6 8,496 7.5 1.30 43 1.00
2015 15,402 12.4 9.0 16 1.2 8.8 3.6 8,522 7.7 1.29 42 1.50
2016 15,490 12.4 9..0 16 1.2 9.0 3.8 8,594 7.9 1.30 42 1.00
Total 14,744 12.2 9.0 17 1.2 8.0 3.7 7,967 7.6 1.30 43 1.00







        
   
 











           
          
           
          
           
         
           
         
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           
          
           






































2009 Yes (Percentage) 43 (37) 40 (35) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 72 (63) 75 (65) 73 (64) 103 (90)
2010 Yes (Percentage) 53 (46) 42 (37) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 62 (54) 73 (63) 73 (64) 103 (90)
2011 Yes (Percentage) 51 (44) 44 (38) 42 (36) 11 (10)
No (Percentage) 64(56) 71 (62) 73 (64) 104 (90)
2012 Yes (Percentage) 64 (56) 44 (38) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 51 (44) 71 (62) 73 (64) 103(90)
2013 Yes (Percentage) 60 (52) 43 (37) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 55 (48) 72 (63) 73 (64) 103 (90)
2014 Yes (Percentage) 47 (41) 45 (39) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 68 (59) 70 (61) 73 (64) 103 (90)
2015 Yes (Percentage) 46 (40) 44 (38) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 69 (60) 71 (62) 73 (64) 103 (90)
2016 Yes (Percentage) 52 (45) 44 (38) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 63 (55) 71 (62) 73 (64) 103 (90)
Average Yes (Percentage) 52 (45) 43 (37) 42 (36) 12 (10)
No (Percentage) 63 (55) 72 (63) 73 (64) 103 (90)







     
                  
                 
                 
                 
                  
                 
                 
                 
                   
                   
                  
                 
                  
                   
                    
                  
                 
    







Table 4: Spearman correlation matrix
Variables † 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
(1) Ln_AUDITFEES 1.0
(2) FAMILY_OWN 0.173* 1.00
(3) FIN_INST_OWN 0.060 -0.19* 1.00
(4) NONFIN_INST_OWN 0.003 -0.18* -0.19* 1.00
(5) GOV_OWN 0.472* -0.108 -0.002 -0.10* 1.00
(6) ARAB_FOR_OWN 0.215* -0.17* -0.106 -0.20* 0.113* 1.00
(7) NONARAB_FOR_OWN 0.283* -0.09* -0.063 -0.19* 0.221* -0.011 1.00
(8) ln_FIRMSIZE 0.663* 0.23* 0.007 0.056 0.41* 0.182* 0.216* 1.00
(9) LEV 0.222* -0.18* -0.069 0.18* 0.10* 0.164* -0.011 0.32* 1.00
(10) NUMSUBS 0.461* -0.061 -0.062 0.096* 0.029 0.11* -0.013 0.31* 0.124* 1.00
(11) LOSS 0.026 -0.076 -0.16* -0.004 -0.08* 0.08* -0.056 -0.16* 0.12* 0.165* 1.00
(12) RISK -0.053 0.065 0.153* -0.20* -0.019 -0.020 0.026 -0.09* -0.23* -0.22* -0.20* 1.00
(13) ROA 0.012 0.055 0.24* -0.04 0.131* -0.055 0.068 0.24* -0.11* -0.079 -0.43* 0.122* 1.00
(14) BIG4 0.484* -0.09* 0.142* 0.06 0.219* 0.15* 0.275* 0.33* 0.109* 0.090 -0.024 -0.031 0.022 1.00
(15) NONAUDIT_FEES -0.034 0.027 -0.143 -0.04 0.121* -0.09* -0.029 -0.004 -0.065 -0.032 0.038 -0.009 -0.010 -0.054 1.00
(16) INDUSTRY -0.063 0.160* -0.08* -0.10* 0.09* -0.028 0.19* -0.11* -0.09* -0.20* -0.12* 0.193* 0.025 -0.08* 0.149 1.0
* Indicates the correlations is significant at level 5%







                  








   
         
                     
                                      
                                 
                                    
                                        
                      
                    
                                
       
                               
                           
                                   
                     
                                                       
                             
                       
    
     
      





Table 5: Regression of the effect of different ownership identities and different control variables on audit quality (measured by ln






Column3: Robust standard 
error regression (Huber-
White’s S. estimator)
Coefficient z value Coefficient t value Coefficient z value
FAMILY_OWN 0.35 2.74*** 0.52 3.11*** 0.35 1.87**
FIN_INST_OWN 0.47 2.51** 0.38 1.26 0.47 1.72*
NONFIN_INST_OWN 0.13 1.39 0.13 1.24 0.13 0.87
GOV_OWN 0.75 5.45*** - - 0.76 6.65***
ARAB_FOR_OWN 0.33 2.36** 0.20 1.20 0.33 2.14**
NONARAB_FOR_OWN 0.60 2.58*** -0.18 -0.50 0.60 1.40
Ln_FIRMSIZE 0.16 7.17*** 0.12 4.10*** 0.16 3.89***
LEV 0.08 0.77 0.06 0.53 0.08 0.54
NUM SUBS 0.06 6.55*** 0.05 3.54*** 0.06 3.22***
LOSS -0.02 -1.56 -0.03 -1.82** -0.02 -1.15
RISK -0.05 -0.77 -0.07 -0.93 -0.05 -0.55
ROA -0.20 -2.21** -0.18 -1.98** -0.20 -1.58
BIG4 0.25 7.04*** 0.24 6.26*** 0.25 2.85***
INDUSTRY 0.09 1.15 - - 0.09 1.16
NONAUDIT_FEES -0.08 -0.86 -0.02 -0.14 -0.08 -0.96
Intercept 5.50 13.16*** 6.30 11.4*** 5.50 7.90***
R-square 0.73 0.48 0.73
F statistics (p-value) 448.61*** 8.34*** 633.37***
† Please refer to Table 2 for definition of the variables







          








      
                      
            
         
               
          
          
         
          
         
              
               
         
         
         
                
   
     
     





Table 6: Regression of the effect of different ownership identities and different








Coefficient t value Coefficient z value
FAMILY_OWN 2.36 3.84*** 1.69 2.11**
FIN_INST_OWN -0.16 -0.14 1.00 1.68*
NONFIN_INST_OWN -0.40 -1.00 -0.10 -0.19
GOV_OWN - - 1.40 3.28***
ARAB_FOR_OWN 0.12 -0.19 0.39 0.82
NONARAB_FOR_OWN 0.65 0.51 1.10 1.33
LEV 0.46 1.11 0.05 0.12
NUMSUBS -0.04 -0.60 0.06 0.95
LOSS -0.06 -0.84 -0.03 -0.45
RISK -0.65 -2.38** -0.56 -1.67*
ROA -1.06 -3.10*** -1.10 -1.79*
BIG4 0.21 1.51 0.30 1.38
INDUSTRY - - 0.38 1.40
NONAUDIT_FEES -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13
Intercept 0.177 0.18 0.48 0.43
R-square 0.18 0.17
F statistics (p-value) 5.92*** 136.01***
† Please refer to Table 2 for definition of the variables







              
         
    
 
     
     
   
       
     
       
  
         
 
       
      
       
    
 
    
     
    
 
           
       
  
    
     
    
 
      
     
     
   
       
        
 
    
       
    
     
   
 
    
    
       
        
       
     
       
    
     
           
    
       
     
       
     
         
              
     
    
      
      
 
                
Appendix (1): A summary of key previous studies that consider the role of ownership structure in audit quality
Author(s) Context Study variables Sample & methodology Main results 
Hay et al., (2008) New
Zealand
The effect of ownership concentration
(>20%), internal audit, audit committee
on audit quality
130 Companies over two years (1995 and
2005) and employed OLS regression.
All variables have a positive relationship with
audit fees.
Jiang and Kim (2004)* Japan Foreign ownership and information
asymmetry
A sample over 18-year period from 1976
to 1994. Time serious and cross -sectional
models are employed to test timing and
magnitude of intertemporal return-earnings
associations.
Negative relationship between foreign
ownership level and information asymmetry.
Kane & Velury (2004) US Institutional investors and audit quality Sample of US industry firms (1992-1996). 
Big 6-dummy variable is used to capture
audit quality.
Positive association between institutional
ownership and audit quality.
Mitra et al., (2007) US Comparing the effect of small
institutional shareholders (< 5%) and
large institutional shareholders (≥5%) on
audit fees.
Sample is limited to the US industrial
firms - for year one year only, 2000.
Positive relationship between small
institutional ownership and audit fees, and a
negative relationship between large
institutional ownership and audit fees.
Niemi (2005) Finland Foreign-owned subsidiaries, state
ownership and audit fees.
Sample of 200 firms for one year (1996). 
The study is limited firms audited only by
the Big Six. Foreign and state ownership
are considered as dummy variables.
Audit fees are higher in foreign-owned
subsidiaries. State ownership has no
significant relationship with audit fees.
Niskanen et al., (2010) Finland Family ownership in small and private
firms & audit quality
Private firms (2000 to 2006). Using The
logit regression model. Big 4-dummy
variable is used to capture audit quality.
The results indicate that family-controlled
firms are less likely to use Big 4 auditors .
Wang (2005)* US Family ownership and earning quality 4,195 firm-year observations that have
proxy statements available in Lexis -Nexis
from 1994 through 2002.
Founding family ownership is associated with
lower abnormal accruals and greater earnings
informativeness.
* These two studies do not consider audit quality, but their results provide insights about the role of ownership structure. 
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